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In the last three decades, neoliberalism has come to dominate most of the West, 
reshaping many institutions according to its ideological belief in markets as the optimal 
form of regulation of social and economic life.  Whereas formerly market ideology was 
contested by collectivist ideas of the public good, at this point of its triumph there is little 
systemic opposition to it. Does psychoanalysis have distinctive insights to offer on 
neoliberalism, and if so, can they contribute to contesting its domination?  Two starting 
points for such a critique are the relational ideas that are the foundations of 
psychoanalytic object-relations approaches, and the post-Kleinian theory of narcissism. 
Neoliberalism is engaged in the remaking of identities and subjectivities in individualist 
terms, and psychoanalytic ideas provide a resource for contesting its conception of 













The purpose of this article is to consider whether psychoanalytic ways of thinking can 
contribute to the understanding of neoliberalism. The paper was originally given at a 
psychoanalytic seminar in England1  on the theme of ‘belonging’. It was appropriate to 
consider neoliberalism in that context since the possessive individualism which 
ideologically underpins it  –  the doctrine that the maximisation of individual economic 
interests is the best means to advance the well-being of all -  rejects the idea that 
humans are  essentially social beings, for whom belonging to  entities larger than the 
self, is essential to identity and wellbeing.  One component of neoliberal ideology has 
explicitly attacked claims made for ‘social goods’, on the grounds that they merely 
mask the self-interest of the individuals or collectivities who advance them.  
 
In After Neoliberalism - the Kilburn Manifesto,2  currently being produced by Soundings 
magazine in on-line monthly instalments, with Stuart Hall, Doreen Massey and myself 
as its principal editors, a critique is being made of the dominance which neoliberalism 
has achieved over the societies of the West, and beyond, over the past thirty years and 
more.   
 
Neoliberal ideas seem to have sedimented into the western imaginary and 
become embedded in popular ‘common sense’. They set the parameters - 
provide the ‘taken-for-granteds’ - of public discussion, media debate and popular 
calculation.  (From the Manifesto Framing Statement).  
 
We describe the ways in which neoliberal ways of thinking have come to pervade most 
aspects of life.   
 
                                            
1 This was a meeting of the ‘New Imago Group’, sponsored by the British Psychoanalytical Society, which 
holds an annual residential event to bring together psychoanalysts and academics.  
2 Each instalment is free online at http://www.lwbooks.co.uk/journals/soundings/manifesto.html, and is 




Our argument here is that this vocabulary of customer, consumer, choice, 
markets and self-interest moulds both us and our understanding of and 
relationship to the world. These descriptions of roles, exchanges and 
relationships in terms of a presumption that individual choice and self-interest 
does and should prevail are a powerful means by which new subjectivities are 
constructed and enforced.  (From ‘Vocabularies of the Economy’.)                      
 
In a recent instalment, we contrast the idea of the self-interested, satisfaction-
maximising individual at the centre of this ideology, with an alternative ‘relational’ 
conception of human flourishing and well-being.  We note that in every stage of human 
life – through infancy, childhood, schooling, the transition to work, in employment, at 
retirement, in old age and illness, and at the end of life, the care and understanding of 
others is essential to human development, and is often even essential for physical 
survival.  
 
We propose that the entire basis of this debate, in the idea of the autonomous, 
self-seeking individual as the foundational ‘atom’ of the human world, is wrongly 
conceived.  Human beings, we believe, are essentially social beings - individual 
freedom and choice, where they emerge and exist, are the outcome of delicate 
and precarious social arrangements, not primordial facts of nature.3  A besetting 
fault - indeed pathology – of contemporary capitalist societies is that in their 
relentless advocacy of individual freedom, gratification, and possessiveness, 
they undermine the very social conditions which make its exercise, for most 
people, possible.   (From ‘A Relational Society’.) 
 
Capitalism has of course been a major if not a dominant force in western societies for 
several hundred years, since the development of market economies at the end of the 
Middle Ages. Its transformations of human capacities and of the material world have 
                                            
3 This idea that individuals are the outcome of complex social arrangements and relationships was the 
starting point of the field of sociology, in the work for example of Emile Durkheim in the second half of the 
nineteenth century. It was the ground for sociology’s critique of the ‘individualist’ disciplines of economics 
and psychology as descriptions of the ontological foundations of human existence. The  rise of sociology 
to prominence during the decades of the post-war welfare settlement, and the  antipathy to it by 
neoliberals (in Britain, Thatcherism) from the 1980s onwards, reflects these differences in world-view, 




been enormously beneficial - the gains for human beings of the enhancements of the 
conditions of life, measured by such basic indicators as life-expectancy, health, literacy, 
and civil peace can hardly be overstated.  One of the reasons why simplistic kinds of 
anti-capitalism, or of ‘environmental purism (‘Nature comes first’) ,  are untenable is 
because of the just claims of the populations of the ‘emerging economies’ (where they 
have even reached the point of ‘emergence’ ) to achieve comparable living standards, 
measured by the above indices, to those of our relatively fortunate selves in the 
economically advanced nations, and because of the sometimes positive role of 
capitalist institutions in bringing about this transition. However these living standards 
are now being seriously diminished in much of the European periphery – for example in 
Greece, Spain and Portugal – and for the majority of the population they have 
stagnated for some years in most of Europe and the United States. 
 
Yet capitalism has never been the only social system, or pattern of values, operating 
within even predominantly capitalist societies.  Some forms of relationship and 
connection have always been based on different principles than those of the pursuit of 
economic gain through market exchange. 4    
 
For example, there are norms of citizenship which require that all citizens be entitled to 
have their freedom protected by the law, regardless of their capacity to purchase 
‘security services’ in the market.  And that all citizens should have political rights, for 
example to vote, which are ascribed on a universal basis, not on the ability to buy them. 
There is even the idea that every citizen is entitled to a basic degree of material 
sustenance, through a welfare system of some kind, usually calibrated at a level which 
provides incentives to work. And similarly, entitlements to education and health, 
provided as the necessary conditions for participation in society, including economic 
                                            
4 It should also be noted that the idea of the individual which has accompanied the development of 
capitalism has not only been a celebration of calculating ‘economic man’. The idea of individuals as the 
bearers of creative powers and capacities, invested in their relationships with persons, materials and 
objects, might also be seen in a larger view as a product of capitalism, even though it has been opposed 
to ‘economism’, and has drawn on pre- and non-capitalist conceptions in its development (for example, 
on religious ideas of the sacred.)  There are important differences between interest-maximising version of 
the individual (whose philosophical origins lie with Hobbes and Bentham), and a view of the individual as 
the subject of expressive self-realisation (Rousseau and John Stuart Mill are among its sources. It may 
thus be that the ideology of individualism can be fruitfully disputed from within, as well as from without. 
The attraction of consumer culture is that it has incorporated some ‘expressive’ aspirations within an 
economic social system whose main driver is nevertheless self-interest. (Rustin 2013a).    
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society. Writers such as Michael Walzer (1983), Arthur Okun (1975) and Michael 
Sandel (2012) have taken note of the ‘blocked exchanges’ which have curtailed the 
scope of market systems in many societies - the purchase of slaves, citizenship, public 
offices, children, and body-parts, for example, are now usually forbidden by law, 
although there are situations in which the power of wealth allows these prohibitions to 
be evaded. 5  For example, where peerages can be bought through political donations, 
or migrants (to the UK) are admitted only if they can meet a ‘financial requirement’.6   
 
What has been happening, with the rise to hegemony of neoliberalism (one can also 
name this system ‘full capitalism’) is that these spheres of autonomous, non-market 
values have been increasingly invaded by the ideologies and practices of markets.   
Because the relations between market and non-market spheres - between capitalist 
and non-capitalist value-systems - have always been  combined in  various intricate 
compromises  (think even of the original constitution of the British National Health 
Service7) it is not always easy  to discern the precise direction of travel.  Because there 
is only limited public assent to the idea that economic self-interest is the primary source 
of social good, even those who are strongly committed to this ideology habitually 
dissemble as they seek to advance it.  Thus the privatisation of the NHS in England 
and Wales, which is happening in plain sight, is officially denied both as a fact and as 
an object of policy. Or consider what is happening to educational universalism – the 
idea that society should provide equal educational opportunity for every child, furthering 
difference but not entrenching equality.  The English school system is being 
fragmented, through the introduction of several different kind of providers, while the role 
of elected local authorities is diminished.   This reform is being pursued with the 
pretence that its main goal is to benefit working class under-achievers, when its real 
intention and effect is to allow the reintroduction of covert pupil selection and to protect 
                                            
5 Michael Sandel’s 2012 book Money Can’t Buy: the Moral Limits of Markets, gives many examples of the 
encroachment of the market in spheres where allocations were formerly made according to principles of 
equality or need.   
6 Contrast this with the famous inscription on the Statue of Liberty: 
“Give me your tired, your poor,  
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,  
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore.  
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed, to me:  
I lift my lamp beside the golden door.” 
 
7 With its tolerance of a private sector, with its GPs operating as independent professional practitioners, 
and with the role of pharmaceutical and other corporations providing vital goods and services). 
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the life chances of those from more advantaged families. The balance of power 
between the owners of capital and those who depend for their living mainly on their  
labour has shifted to a major degree in favour of the owners, as the rights and powers 
which have formerly protected employees  are undermined through, for example, 
health and safety at work legislation, employment protection, rights to collective 
bargaining, and minimum wage requirements.  The rationale for this is that such 
‘flexible labour markets’ are necessary to meet the competition of emerging economies. 
Thus a global market exercises its pressures on the entitlements of employees in every 
locality. In politics too, the idea of equal citizens’ entitlements is compromised by the 
power of the institutions of capital to make demands upon governments outside of any 
democratic  process (what the bond-holders demand trumps what the voters might 
want their governments to do), and by corporate  influence on party funding and on the 
media of communication. (Crouch 2004 and 2011.)    
 
In an economy devoted to acquisition and consumption, commercial popular culture 
and advertising does much to propagandise its world-view.  The saga of the English 
football Premier League transfer deadline in August 2013 was  revealing in this respect.  
The most celebrated events were the transfer of Gareth Bale to Real Madrid for £86 
million and of Mesut Özil to Arsenal for £42.5 million.  Arsenal fans had demanded that  
Arsène Wenger prove his virility in the transfer market by making a purchase on this 
scale. They and other clubs’ fans appear to be mostly indifferent to the sources of their 
favourite clubs’ money, and any ethical issues which this might involve. It seems 
possible that the game of Fantasy Football, in which participants ‘manage’ virtual teams 
with imaginary transfer budget, has become a significant influence on fans’ relations to 
their sport.  In fantasy, we can thus all become entrepreneurs now.  
 
What is striking about this situation is the absence of any articulate or coherent 
alternative to the ideological system of market exchange through which these 
mchanges in our society are being effected. It is not that most people like what they 
see is going on. It seems that they don’t, since opinion polls show that they hold most 
politicians and bankers, and many corporations, in low regard. Often popular anger is 
diverted away from what is of greatest importance (several issues in Psychoanalysis, 
Culture & Society 19(1) have discussed this diversion – psychoanalytically we might 
say unconscious projection – of antagonism and resentment towards the poor and the 
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vulnerable).   For example In Britain there was a scandal in 2011 causing great public 
outrage in which several Members of Parliament were shown to have made false or 
excessive expenses claims. Although this was an unedifying instance of the political 
class abusing its power, the sums of money involved were generally quite small, 
whereas large  banks and corporations continue to cost  citizens billions in  avoided 
taxes, or  in subventions and bail-outs funded ultimately by taxation, but receive  much 
less attention or criticism  from the major media.   
 
What  most publics  do not now have available are different organised ways of seeing 
the world, of a value-based kind, which would enable them to say, of an invasion of a 
relationship until now organised according to a norm of universal entitlement or gift,  
‘No, this act of marketisation violates an important principle.’ The great loss involved in 
the discrediting of ‘socialism’ (both in its Marxist and its more ‘ethical’ or Christian 
versions) is that its ideologies had bundled together, in some kinds of coherent 
synthesis, different aspects of a non-marketised conception of the world. In an earlier 
period, prior to 1980, there were opposed principles being contested when major 
political decisions were being made, and negotiation and debate between them took 
place. But more recently, clear differences of principle between the political parties are 
hard to find.  
 
In the earlier post-war period, the principles of the market had to compete with different 
values, and it was not assumed that market criteria were the only ones that mattered. 
For example, value was assigned to the family, as a source of well-being which needed 
support, when the welfare state was established - welfare was not then merely a 
system to incentivise participation in the labour market. In the sphere of schooling, 
importance was attached to the development of the imagination and of a diversity of 
capacities in pupils, goals which were much broader than the mere skilling of future 
employees to which education is being reduced.  There was commitment to the idea 
that the rights of labour need to be supported, to rebalance an otherwise unequal 
system of market exchange. And to the idea of  ‘the commons ‘ (Polanyi  1944,   Bollier 
and Helfrich 2013)  a principle of shared social ownership of natural resources such as 
land – as the rationale  for protecting the natural environment and public access to it. 
Thus the power of markets was circumscribed by boundaries, defining different 




In the absence today of any  alternative synthesis of non-market perspectives of a 
coherent kind,  each of these separate spheres of value and practice is left to struggle 
on its own, through its own pressure groups, NGOs  and campaigns. Political parties 
have become weak aggregators of different interests and claims, but find it difficult to 
articulate these within a coherent view of the world and its alternative possible futures.  
Even with the British Conservatives, where neoliberal ideology is the most powerful 
driver of what they do, their public rhetoric often seeks to conceal this, for example with 
Cameron advocating a ‘Big Society’ at the very time when its programme of 
marketisation was undermining most social bonds, and when its withdrawal of state 
funding from voluntary organisations was weakening many of the agencies on whose 
activities the idea depended.  
 
Colin Crouch (2013)   has valuably pointed out that even the rule of markets is now 
more an ideology which masks corporate dominance, than the economic reality. Large 
corporations are increasingly able to destroy competition through monopolistic 
practices, through their influence on government, and through the media and political 
financing of the electoral process.  Many governments are coming to resemble the 
‘executive committees of the bourgeoisie’ (the owners of capital) of Marx’s description.  
While Marx’s conception of how a transition to socialism might be achieved was deeply 
flawed, his analysis of the unstoppable global dynamic of capitalism remains unrivalled. 
(Desai 2002).   
 
One can wonder whether neoliberalism is now coming to constitute a ‘totalitarian’ 
phenomenon. By this I mean a system whose doctrines function as fantasies about 
how the world is and should be,  and whose holders of power cease to take account of 
the discrepancies between fantasy and fact, and thus fail to see the need to engage 
critically with reality.  Neoliberalism is in most situations (though not all, if one considers 
for example episodes of ‘shock therapy’ in post-Allende Chile or post-Gorbachev 
Russia) a slow-burning kind of totalitarianism, in that while its believers hold that its 
enemies and its others need to be pressured, weakened, re-educated and disciplined 
until they exist no more, they mostly deploy means to this end which fall short of 
physical violence.   This is different from the implementation of the more radical 
‘elimination fantasies’ of the Jacobins, the Stalinists, or the Maoists (or indeed of  
9 
 
Cambodia under Pol Pot or Chile under Pinochet)  where extremely  brutal means were 
deployed to bring social realities in line with the totalitarian rulers’  motivating fantasies. 
These were always, in paranoid-schizoid mode, about the imagined locations of 
progress and reaction, of pure good and pure evil.   
 
A Place for Psychoanalysis in this Debate?  
The question to be asked is whether psychoanalytic ways of thinking have anything to 
offer us in understanding the world of neoliberal hegemony. This is different from 
asking what psychoanalysts as individuals, or even as professional organisations 
should do, for example in standing up for the survival of their NHS or voluntary sector 
psychotherapy clinics against demands made in the name of market forces. Those are 
matters of good citizenship, and while psychotherapists should take on their civic 
responsibilities like everyone else, the most important contribution which 
psychoanalysis can make is surely in providing some distinctive understanding of this 
system, and also perhaps in inventing practices which might challenge its direction.  
 
Successful psychoanalytic interventions in major political debates in modern times are 
a rarity. However one leading example is that of Hanna Segal’s contribution to the 
debate about nuclear weapons in the 1980s (Segal 1987). Her distinctively 
psychoanalytic idea was that the postures of the Cold War, on both sides, were 
sustained by the unconscious allure of the idea of mass destruction. This desire was of 
course denied by each side in the conflict, and projected in paranoid-schizoid fashion 
on to the other. Curiously enough, this symmetrical projection of deadly intentions did 
give some psychological stability to the antagonisms of the Cold War. Rational actors 
within the governing systems on both sides (Robert McNamara was one such, so far as 
nuclear strategy was concerned) at the same time made efforts to reduce the risks 
constituted by the trigger-ready nuclear arsenals.  Only if these unconscious 
predispositions - a version of Freud’s death instinct in her view - were consciously 
recognised, she implied, would anything be changed.    
 
Some of the paranoid-schizoid anxieties of the nuclear arms race and the Cold War 
were unlocked, primarily by Gorbachev (with help from the European anti-nuclear 
campaigns) just as related anxieties were unlocked in South Africa by Mandela. But the 
structure of feeling in the West at the end of the Cold War became merely triumphalist, 
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with a general inability to feel pain or remorse for the terrible risks that had been taken. 
Far from allowing the emergence of feelings of respect and reparation towards the 
defeated enemy, the prevailing motive was to drive Communism from the face of the 
earth. Thus, in the absence of mourning or remorse, and remaining within the 
paranoid-schizoid structure which had sustained the Cold War one enemy 
(Communism) was simply replaced by another (‘Islamic fundamentalism’) enabling the 
West to remain on a permanent war footing with scarcely any interruption.  This is the 
continuing  ‘war on terror’ (since its enemy is so nebulous, the term is almost an 
invitation to terror in itself), but it has led to a continuing series of  actual wars in the 
Middle East, in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and by proxy Syria, to name only four.  Segal 
had predicted before the first Gulf War that this paranoid-schizoid structure (with all the 
material and political interests which depended on it) would need and would find a new 
object, and events demonstrated the power of her essentially psychoanalytic insight.  
 
Can we develop a correspondingly insightful analysis of the unconscious dimensions of 
the hegemony of neoliberalism, which might enable psychoanalysts to make some 
useful contribution to this debate?    
 
We might begin by thinking about the psychological concomitants of possessive 
individualism as a state of mind, at both an individual and a collective level. 
Psychoanalysts, certainly in its British ‘object relations’ tradition,  holds that excessive 
reliance on the self arises from perceived or fantasied failures of relationship. Melanie 
Klein in particular rejected Freud’s idea of ‘primary narcissism’ (and the slow 
emergence of the infant self into an awareness of others) holding by contrast that 
human infants are born with an innate expectation of relationship with and dependence 
on parental ‘objects’. There seems to be an early innate awareness of siblings also 
imbued with ambivalence towards them.  The Kleinian view of the Oedipal situation 
from the point of view of the infant is that it is as much concerned with the procreation 
of new (and potentially rival) babies  as it is with libidinal desires towards  the parents.It 
follows from this view that narcissism is essentially a form of defence, which arises 
from disappointment with or distrust of the ‘objects’ on which the self depends for its 
emotional sustenance. This defensive structure displaces one in which love for and 
identification with ‘objects’ (persons, in fact)  are the primary basis of identity, in which 
the desires and needs of the self (which remain central to its well-being)  have to take 
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account of the desires, needs and indeed complex reality of the other. This is Klein’s 
‘depressive position’, in which the self is able to take its place in a relationship in which 
it has responsibility to others, as well as itself.  Its polar opposite of course is the 
‘paranoid-schizoid position’, in which in which good and bad attributes, the objects of 
love and hate, are split between the self and those with whom it identifies, and others 
who are conceived as alien and hostile. 
 
The post-Kleinian theory of narcissism, developed by Britton (1998, 2003), Rey (1994), 
Rosenfeld (1971), and Steiner (1993) identifies an organisation of the personality 
through which the self is able to avoid  the polar positions of depressive and paranoid-
schizoid states, since each in their different ways is liable to generate intolerable levels 
of anxiety. Instead, in this ‘borderline’ state, a posture of emotional neutrality or 
indifference is adopted.  The self learns to survive and even prosper in a world in which 
relations with objects cannot be depended on, adopting strategies of prudent self-
reliance to cope with what is felt to be at root an untrustworthy and unfriendly world.  
Rosenfeld developed a key distinction between libidinal and destructive narcissism 
(mapping the concept of narcissism on to Freud’s idea of life and death instincts), to 
differentiate between individuals who were primarily motivated by self-idealisation and 
by the denial of negative feelings, and those whose internal identification was with a 
destructive object, envious of life and sustaining its identity through covert or overt 
contempt for others.  Destructive narcissism is especially difficult to treat in 
psychoanalysis, since it is the analytic process itself which is liable to be belittled and 
attacked.  
 
Suppose we connect these ideas to a widespread experience of a world whose social 
bonds have become for many people weaker than they once were.  Families have 
become smaller (although more long-living) so the numbers of kin with whom most 
individuals will feel a relationship is small.  Religious belief and membership has also 
declined, although of course this is subject to much variation, communities of recent 
immigrants for example often relying heavily on flourishing churches, mosques and 
temples to maintain social identities and connectedness.  (Other contributors to these 
linked issues of PCS have pointed out the unusual religiosity of people in the United 
States, suggesting that this is a consequence of the deep existential insecurity of 
American life.) Trade unions, political attachments and their cultures have become 
12 
 
weaker, thus lessening another mode of ‘social solidarity’. For all their hardships, it 
seems that the industrial and mining communities of Wales, the North of England, and 
Scotland, and their equivalents in other countries, developed cultures which had many 
strengths. 8  For many, localities have become weaker  nodes of identification.  For 
example, the hollowing-out of the High Street, and the relocation of a great deal of 
commerce in impersonal malls and in on-line shopping (this process is still more 
advanced in the UK than in the USA) removes many opportunities for face-to-face 
encounters, and for relationships which although limited in their scope, were  more 
substantial in terms of mutual awareness and respect than are the connections usually 
made at a supermarket checkout or with  Amazon. Ryanair, a highly successful low-
cost Irish airline operating in the UK, for long almost made a virtue of its indifference to 
its customers’ well-being, until finally the reputational damage done to it by its habitual  
rudeness seems to have led to a change of heart by its C.E.O.    
 
Against this must be counterposed the many opportunities which consumption-
oriented, individualised societies offer to people.  In face of the threatened 
depersonalisation and isolation of multiple market-places, intense efforts are made to 
make commercial transactions occasions which give some of the satisfactions of 
human recognition.  In fact, even conversations with an ‘agent’ at a call centre can be 
agreeable, when the operation is a well-organised one, and if the caller tries to make 
something of the human contact.  Looking at publicity from a conference I attended 
recently at the University of Hertfordshire, given out both by the University and by 
Hatfield House (stately home of the Marquess of Salisbury, but also now a multi-
functional centre for leisure and tourism) one noted the diversity of ‘offers’ being made 
of enjoyable and more or less educative activities around Hatfield by both institutions. 
Diagnosing the costs and benefits of provision in this individualised, customerised 
world, is not simple.  Ryanair was unusual in its brutal repudiation of the ethos of 
customer-care.  
 
                                            
8 There is a substantial literature about this, for example Richard Hoggart’s The Uses of Literacy (1957)     
Michael Young and Peter Willmott’s  Family and Kinship in East London (1957), and Brian Jackson’s 
Working Class Community (1968). The cultural renaissance in Britain of the post-war period owed a lot 
the emergence of the new ‘voices’ of a generation of people from working class backgrounds who were 
given educational opportunities for the first time. 
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For myself, I note that it is possible to hold more-or- less radical  or socialist 
convictions, yet live in a rather old-fashioned way. For example, married to the same 
person for 50 years, and working for the same university for 49 years. Occupying the 
same house for 40 years, two miles from children, grandchildren, and other close 
relations.  Even my political and cultural attachments have been long-lasting, in virtually 
lifelong attachment to successive re-incarnations of the 1950s New Left, and, from a 
little later, to the culture of psychoanalysis.  This is hardly a state of rootlessness.  Nor 
is it so exceptional. 
 
Nevertheless, one expects that the concomitant of the general weakening of social ties 
and interdependencies which the hegemony of neoliberalism brings about will be 
increased degrees of anxiety, and what we can call, following Menzies Lyth (1959), 
unconscious defences against anxiety. This is most obviously seen in those inhabiting 
the most disadvantaged parts of the social system.  Richard Wilkinson’s and Kate 
Pickett’s demonstrations (2010) of the consequences of greater inequality for health 
and well-being are momentous in this respect.  They argue – indeed demonstrate with 
strong statistical evidence - that disrespect, powerlessness and vulnerability cause 
illness and disease. Epidemics of obesity, and the persistence of tobacco addictions 
and alcohol abuse in low-income populations, are, in their argument, the effects of poor 
self-esteem.  ‘No one cares about us, so we cannot care for ourselves’, is the implicit 
story.   The widespread contemporary incidence of depression and of mediatised 
treatments for it, is another symptom of a pervasive anxiety which is by no means 
confined to the worse-off. Another is an epidemic of eating disorders among the 
privileged.  The public response to the 2007-8 financial crisis may be another symptom 
of pervasive unconscious anxiety, in this case about public greed. The economic 
sacrifices which have been imposed by the UK’s Coalition government seem to have 
been felt by many to have been a deserved punishment for ‘living above our means’, 
even though this idea of a shared guilt is tendentious. It is remarkable how difficult it 
has been to hold the banks and the financial sector responsible for a collapse which 
was primarily of their making. 
 
Another function of pervasive social anxiety is the unconscious desire to displace 
disrespect and the self-contempt to which it gives rise on to some other object.  
Antagonism towards migrants, asylum seekers, and alleged ‘benefit scroungers’ has 
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become a major current of feeling in contemporary Britain,  and is being mobilised by 
populist politicians, such as Nigel Farage of the UK Independence Party.  However it is 
not only the powerless victims of the market free-for-all who become caught up in this 
kind of scapegoating intolerance. Another feeling which is mobilised is the unconscious 
guilt of the relatively fortunate, for the neglect of or damage to others which is implied 
by their own privilege. This is the ‘depressive’ side of this unconscious ‘defence against 
anxiety’.  There is a ‘contamination anxiety’ too, the paranoid-schizoid aspect of this 
defence, expressed in the belief that that mere association with the less worthy may 
‘rub off’ on the self, and imperil its success. This manifests itself in a kind of thinking-by-
classes, in Matte Blanco’s term (Matte Blanco 1988) Thus, students can be evaluated 
by reference to the elite, world-class or other status of the university they attend, as if 
the merit of their university (measured by various aggregate measures of performance) 
can be claimed as their personal merit too. This seems like an unconscious default to a 
belief in ‘natural’ hierarchy, earlier founded on the claims of noble or gentlemanly birth, 
now transposed to the meritocratic worth conferred by membership of educational 
institutions of reported ‘excellence.’ 
 
Both anxieties find expression in social avoidance and self-segregation.  Earlier 
principles of egalitarian allocation of goods and resources entailed as their 
consequence socially diverse neighbourhoods. Public and private housing were often 
in spatial juxtaposition. Schools had mixed social intakes. Even now, NHS hospitals 
bring patients from all sections of society into mutual proximity, and allocate care to 
them by reference to their clinical need.  But in the current environment, what the ability 
to pay is able to buy are neighbours of a certain class, who become exclusive co-users 
of facilities such as schools and private parks. ‘Gated communities’ , with the concerns 
about security and their restrictions on freedom for children are an extreme instance of 
such chosen segregation9 , which perhaps arises in part  from paranoid anxiety among 
the privileged about the envy of others, and from the fear of their imagined retribution. 
The more widespread pattern is the social ‘zoning’ of cities into neighbourhoods 
stratified by economic level.  While such zoning is of course far from new, it is being 
accentuated by increasing inequalities, and by the weakening of non-market methods 
                                            
9 A block of new flats 100 yards from my house near Kilburn station has a locked gate and underground 
car-park, a high mental  fence and security lights, whereas the hundred-year old, and much more 
attractive  mansion block  next door has none of these  - a local indicator of changing times. 
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and criteria of housing allocation which were designed to countervail those of the 
market.  10 Prior to Margaret Thatcher’s assault on local authority housing, for example 
via her ‘right to buy’ legislation, and by the transfer of properties from local authority 
ownership to that of housing associations,  one third of households in the UK were 
living in properties owned by local councils. The proportion is now a fraction of that.  
However the ’dream’ which  inspired this change, the idea that nearly every family 
would come to ‘own its own home’ has become chimerical,  as rising  prices  put house 
ownership out of reach, in London and the south east of England,  of people of average 
income. Housing supply in Britain is a singular instance of market failure.  
 
This kind of separation of groups into more and less advantaged by market forces now 
also has a huge regional expression in Britain, in the difference between the levels of 
affluence of the south-east, and some other zones of southern England, and its 
absence in those other parts of Britain whose prosperity depended on now vanished 
industries. 
 
The Pathologies of Neoliberalism 
What I am suggesting is that the denial of relational needs inherent in the ideology of 
neoliberalism and the all-pervasive market is a source of widespread anxiety and 
psychic pain, an invisible burden detracting from the benefits and opportunities which 
can arise from market competition. Whilst its most obvious bearers are those most 
disadvantaged in competitive environments, these are by no means its only victims.  
The expectation that the defended, narcissistic self which is shaped in this context will 
treat others primarily as means to its own ends, rather than objects of value in 
themselves, depletes the self as well as its objects.  
 
In an earlier paper, ‘States of Narcissism’,  Margaret Rustin and I  took note of the 
consequences of the restructuring of universities into quasi-corporations, preoccupied 
with maximising their measured outputs in a competitive system, for the identity and 
                                            
10 Prior to Margaret Thatcher’s assault on local authority housing, for example via her ‘right to buy’ 
legislation, and by the transfer of properties from local authority ownership to that of housing associations,  
one third of households in the UK were living in properties owned by local councils. The proportion is now 
a fraction of that.  However the ’dream’ which  inspired this change, the idea that nearly every family 
would come to ‘own its own home’ has become chimerical,  as rising  prices  put house ownership out of 
reach, in London and the south east of England,  of people of average income. Housing supply in Britain 
is a singular instance of market failure.  
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work-satisfaction of academics. (Rustin and Rustin 2011).  We argued that a 
narcissistic form of ‘social character’ was being nurtured by this system. The primary 
objects or ends of university life - the academic’s ‘subject’ and his or her students – 
were becoming means, to the enhancement of status and reputation.  What comes to 
matter is not the intrinsic meaning of work in a subject, or with a student, but how this 
work is perceived and measured.11 The CV becomes a more intense object of concern 
than the work which it summarises.   
 
Narcissistic withdrawal from engagement with the primary realities and needs of 
working tasks takes other forms.  Child care catastrophes in Britain have revealed 
organisations and their staffs functioning in essentially unseeing and unthinking ways, 
declining to take notice of danger-signs that should have prompted remedial action 
(Rustin M.E. 2005).12   
 
This argument has been broadened to characterise  the psychopathology of the entire 
welfare system (Cooper and Lousada 2005). The intrusive processes of monitoring, 
target-setting and regulation which are used to constrain ‘public’ value-driven 
organisations to behave like market-oriented ones, provide many opportunities for 
individuals to become immersed in obsessional routines and measures, while losing 
sight of the central purpose of the work in question.  
 
It is by constraining individuals to accept this redefinition of their everyday reality, and 
to comply with it in order to avoid sanction, that the new subjectivities of neoliberalism 
are routinely produced. The system’s mode of governmentality, in Foucauldian terms, 
(Foucault et al 1991)  ‘designs in’ the production of a self-regarding self, by the ways in 
which it rewards self-interested behaviours (and sanctions their failure), and attacks  
commitments to objects, values, and relationships with others.   One can see the 
pressures of this system within many contexts of working life, in which intrinsic 
motivational goals become displaced by extrinsic ones.  This development must also 
                                            
11 Roger Burrows’ (2012)  powerfully shows how  many disciplines of quantity and rank imposed on 
faculty and students alike  are transforming the nature  and purpose  of university education.  He 
describes an extensive  Foucauldian process of remaking the human subject, into an entity compliant 
with the ethos of the neoliberal order.  
12 John Steiner’s (1993) idea of ‘turning a blind eye’, originally describing what had escaped everyone’s 
notice in Sophocles’  Oedipus Rex, has been influential in characterising an aspect of the borderline or 
narcissistic state of mind.  
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have its concomitant in the earlier years of life, when, according to psychoanalysis, 
basic personality formation takes place.  The formative process here must be the 
diminished capacity of parents (or others) to be a primary nurturing presence in 
children’s lives. If narcissism is defined as a defensive response to their absence of 
dependable, loving and trustworthy relationships, at any stage of life, then the 
difficulties for parents and others of providing such care must a factor in its causes.  
The pressure of working lives on parents, the break-up of residential communities and 
thus extended family relationships, addictions to consumption as a surrogate for love,  
celebrity identifications as a substitute for the real, dependence on ‘virtual’ worlds for 
emotional sustenance,  the  projection into children of  parental anxieties about success 
and failure, and of course the more acute social symptoms of drug addiction and family 
breakdown, all lessen the emotional containment available for children and young 
people’s development.  Generalisation is nevertheless difficult in this sphere, since 
while one strong tendency is  towards the instrumentalisation of relationships, there are 
counter-movements seeking to enrich them, for example in greater commitments to 
paternal and maternal involvement in the care of children,  and a deepened vocabulary 
of emotions  in contemporary culture, an aspect of its partial ‘feminisation’. There is still 
a considerable resonance in Christopher Lasch’s famous critique of the Culture of 
Narcissism’ (1979).  But where he was inclined to hold its primary cause to lie with the 
breakdown of social bonds due to excessive aspirations and demands for self-
expression and self-realisation (with the ‘sixties generation’ and feminist critics of the 
family  among the culprits), our analysis here –  of a different  phase in this 
development -   is more focused on the systemic and indeed political inculcation of an 
ideology of instrumental self-interest and unthinking institutional compliance  as its main 
cause. In fact, the enemy of creativity and fulfilment in this system is as much its 
antipathy to understanding and reflection as it is its deficits of love, an idea which W.R. 
Bion (Bion 1962, O’Shaughnessy 1981) has made central to psychoanalysis.    
 
Where a private sector institution already has profit-making as its central goal, such 
displacements of purpose may be less visible - although even in the corporate sector 
these degenerative processes can be seen. For example, when a company formerly 
committed to its own distinctive products, and to a relationship with its workforce in 
which there is some sense of shared commitment and obligation, finds that it has to 
abandon these values because of pressures of market anxieties, or because, following 
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a corporate takeover, new owners appear interested only in short-term returns. There is 
a question of whether a single- minded preoccupation with markets may not in any 
case undermine the conditions of success within them. Sometimes what is made and 
the way in which it is made has to be valued for itself, for there to be anything which will 
have much of an exchange value.   
 
There is, I hope, the basis of an argument here, concerning some self-destructive 
attributes of neoliberal ideology and practice. Where relational needs are unmet, and 
respect and recognition to people are denied, human capacities will be undermined.  
The anxieties arising from failures of dependency and trust will impact both on the most 
obvious ‘failures’ in competitive environments, but also on those who appear 
successful.  Blame and avoidance (including that involved in willed ignorance of others’ 
circumstances) will follow as unconscious defences against both paranoid-schizoid and 
depressive anxieties, both among the relatively successful and unsuccessful. The 
effect of turning a blind eye is to make us increasingly blind.  
 
A large problem in this situation is a self-sustaining momentum which such defensive 
responses can acquire.  The mistreatment of victims leads to yet more fear, anxiety 
and guilt about them.  Since everyone is liable to be exposed, at their own ‘level’, to 
similar pressures to prove their worth, there will seem to be little space to seek out 
ways of being involving greater trust or compassion.  If one is positioned on a slope 
which is getting ever steeper, it is hard to think about anything beyond keeping one’s 
own foothold.  
 
Where we now are is, I fear, on this slope. The question is whether the arguments that 
need to be made for ‘belonging’ and ‘relationship’, in all its various forms, and for the 
social systems and practices necessary to sustain this, can gain sufficient traction to 
make a difference.  13  And whether a psychoanalytic perspective on unconscious 
defences against anxiety can add anything valuable to the political and moral 
arguments against fundamentalist individualism.  
                                            
13 At an earlier time, it took a World War, and the struggle against the violent Nazi version of a competitive 
ethos, to generate sufficient social solidarity for more relational values to find a significant space. When 
the enemy is literally within, in those parts of ourselves shaped by these defensive narcissistic structures,  
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